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I. Report on Arbitration Appeals
BE IT RESOLVED that the American Bar Association urges the Con-
gress to amend Title 9 of the United States Code (Arbitration) to add a
new Section relating to Appeals, or, alternatively, to enact other com-
parable legislation, which would provide in pertinent part for appeals
from interlocutory orders of a trial court either refusing a stay of litigation
pending arbitration, or denying an application to compel arbitration, or
granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against an arbitration.
REPORT*
It has long been recognized that the Federal courts of appeals ought to
hear appeals from some interlocutory orders entered by the district courts
in civil cases. Interlocutory appeals are not allowed from all orders in-
volving injunctions, receiverships, and liability in marine collision cases.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). In addition, for more than 25 years, appeals have
been authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), by certification of the trial
judge and leave of the circuit court.
The latter procedure has not, however, been completely satisfactory.
There are many interlocutory orders which are not certified by trial judges,
but which are nonetheless worthy of early review. See, e.g., Coastal Steel
Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator, 709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
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U.S. 938 (1983); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Benjamin F. Shaw Co.,
706 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1983); Pitney Bowes v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983). To find jurisdiction to hear such
appeals, the courts have resorted to more and more elaborate interpre-
tations of the concepts of "final orders," and "injunctions" from which
appeals are authorized as of right. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(a)(1); see, e.g.,
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) [the "Cohen
doctrine"]; Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp.,
293 U.S. 449 (1935); but cf. Carson v. American Brands, 450 U.S. 79, 84
(1981).I
This complicated procedural matrix has created chaos in appeals from
orders disposing of applications to compel or to stay arbitration, and to
stay litigation pending the outcome of arbitration. There have been more
than 100 cases raising such appealability issues in the last 10 years, at
least a dozen each in 1983, 1984, and 1985 alone. The Seventh Circuit
summed up the area as "one of, 'medieval if not Byzantine peculiarities'
... and a 'source of understandable confusion to the bar' ... where the
law is 'constantly changing.' " Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 404 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1984). The First Circuit views it as
a "Serbonian Bog, where whole cases have sunk from sight." Hartford
Financial Systems v. Florida Software Services, 712 F.2d 724, 727 (1st
Cir. 1983).
MOTION TO STAY LITIGATION (9 U.S.C. § 3)
An appeal to a circuit court from the grant or denial of a motion to stay
an action pending arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 3 does not lie as an appeal
from a "final decision" under the Cohen doctrine. See Baltimore Con-
tractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955); US M Corp. v. G K N Fasteners,
574 F.2d 17, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1978). However, an interlocutory appeal may
be taken, as from an order pertaining to an "injunction," if, half a century
ago, before adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the suit
would have been regarded as one "at law" rather than "in equity." See
Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, supra; Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co.
v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 720 F.2d 1446, 1447 n.1 (5th Cir.
1. At times the circuit courts have had to be almost ingenious to get around the problem
of a refusal of a district judge to issue a 1292(b) certificate. See In re McClelland Engineers,
742 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1985). When all else fails,
the circuit courts may sometimes resort to writ of mandamus as a substitute for appeal.
Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); Colonial Times v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). However, mandamus is not available in arbitration cases. Coastal (Bermuda) v.
E.W. Saybolt & Co., 761 F.2d (5th Cir. 1985); Timberlake v. Oppenheimer & Co., 729 F.2d
515, 519 (7th Cir. 1984); USM Corp. v. GKN Fasteners, 574 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1978).
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1983); Rhone Mediterranee v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1983); U S M
Corp. v. G K N Fasteners, supra. No interlocutory appeal is permitted if
the suit goes forward "in equity" (the so-called Enelow-Ettelson rule). 2
See Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, supra; Timberlake v. Oppenhei-
mer, 729 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1984); Hartford Financial Systems v. Florida
Software Serv., 712 F.2d 724 (Ist Cir. 1983). This doctrine has been char-
acterized as "lacking a rational basis by most of the courts of appeals
and even by the Supreme Court itself." H. C. Lawton v. Truck Drivers,
Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 384, 755 F.2d 324, 327 n.2 (3d Cir.
1985).
Moreover, for reasons "more historical than logical" (Texaco v. Amer-
ican Trading & Transp. Co., 644 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981)), an interlo-
cutory appeal relating to an injunction is not authorized in a maritime
case because, in older days, admiralty courts lacked the power to issue
injunctions. Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg America Line, 294 U.S. 454
(1935); Coastal (Bermuda) v. E.W. Saybolt & Co., 761 F.2d 198 (5th Cir.
1985); Gave Shipping Co. v. Parcel Tankers, 634 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1980);
but cf. Rhone Mediterranee v. Lauro, supra.3
MOTIONS TO COMPEL ARBITRATION (9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 206)
If a party commences an action to compel another party to proceed to
arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4, an order granting or denying the application
is a final appealable order, regardless of whether the suit goes forward at
law, in equity or in admiralty. Americana Fabrics v. L & L Textiles, 754
F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1985); County of Durham v. Richards, 742 F.2d 811
(4th Cir. 1984). 4 If the district court neither grants nor denies the appli-
2. Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942). Where a complaint contains both legal and equitable claims
to which arbitration is raised as a defense, the appealability of the order granting or denying
a stay pending the outcome of arbitration depends on whether the case is predominantly
an action at law, Mediterranean Enterprises v.. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir.
1983); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979); Lee v. Ply Gem
Indus., 593 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979) or whether the equitable
relief sought is merely incidental, Oasis Oil & Ref. Corp. v. Armada Transp. & Ref. Co.,
719 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1983); Langley v. Colonial Leasing Co., 707 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1983);
Poriss v. AAACON Auto Transp., 685 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1982), or whether the equitable claim
is frivolous. Mellon Bank v. Pritchard-Kean Mfg. Corp., 651 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1981).
3. Some circuit courts have held that the district courts sitting in admiralty now have
power to issue injunctions. See, e.g., Compania Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion v.
A.J. Perez Export Co., 303 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1962). That has not, however, affected non-
appealability under the decision in the Schoenamsgruber case. Coastal (Bermuda) v. E. W.
Saybolt & Co., supra.
4. There is an exception. An appeal is not allowed if the denial of the petition was on
the ground that trial was required to resolve a factual dispute about whether an agreement
to arbitrate existed. John Thompson Beacon Windows v. Ferro, 232 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir.
1956); cf. Matterhorn v. NCR Corp., 727 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1984).
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cation, but instead stays the suit, thereby suspending both litigation and
arbitration, such an order itself is appealable as a final order. Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983);
but cf. Acton Corp. v. Borden, 670 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1982) [stay pending
outcome of parallel Federal suit].
There is a conflict among the circuits about the appealability of an order
in an ordinary civil suit granting or denying a motion under 9 U.S.C. § 4
to compel arbitration of one or more claims sued on. Compare Matterhorn
v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1985) [not appealable] with Howard
Elec. & Mech. Co. v. Frank Briscoe Co., 754 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1985);
Sweater Bee v. Manhattan Indus., 754 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
-. U.S. - (1985); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Benjamin F. Shaw
Co., 706 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1983); City of Naples v. Prepakt Concrete, 494
F.2d 511, 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974) [appealable].
Such an order is not appealable in admiralty. Tradax v. M. V. Holendrecht,
550 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1977).
However, recently the Fifth Circuit held in an admiralty case that the
denial of a motion to compel arbitration is appealable when the order is
made under 9 U.S.C. § 206, a special statute which was enacted to imple-
ment the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards. Sedco v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 767 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1985).
STAY OF ARBITRATION
The circuits are in conflict over whether an order granting or denying
a motion to stay arbitration constitutes an injunction for purposes of
interlocutory appeal. Compare Alascom v. ITT North Elec. Co., 727 F.2d
1419 (9th Cir. 1984); City of Meridian v. Algernon Blair, 721 F.2d 525 (5th
Cir. 1983); Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Institute, 466
F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1972) [appealable]; with Stateside Mach. Co. v. Alperin,
526 F.2d 480 (3d Cir. 1975); Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus.,
516 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975) [not appealable].
Two circuits have ruled, in support of a policy favoring arbitration, that
an order staying arbitration is appealable, but an order refusing such a
stay is not appealable. North Supply Co. v. Greater Dev. & Serv. Corp.,
728 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984); New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum
Corp., 456 F.2d 1983 (1st Cir. 1972); see also Alascom v. ITT North Elec.
Co., supra; Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., supra; cf. Carson
v. American Brands, 450 U.S. 79 (1981). 5
5. Appealability issues have likewise arisen in other arbitration matters such as appli-
cations to consolidate arbitrations (compare Weyerhauser v. Western Seas Shipping Co.,
743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1984); Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F.
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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The Supreme Court has noted the "incongruity" of having appealability
of orders affecting arbitration turn on "outmoded procedural differentia-
tions" but the Court has left it up to Congress to deal with the problem.
Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, supra, at 184-85.
Arbitration usually avoids lengthy and expensive discovery, leading to
a quick, cheap decision on the merits by knowledgeable experts. The
principle behind the growing experiments in compulsory court-annexed
arbitration is that a decision on the merits, even if nonbinding, often brings
a matter to an end, with concomitant savings in time and money. The
same may be expected of an order mistakenly sending parties to arbitra-
tion. This advantage would be lost if such an order was subject to early
appellate review.
However, when a district judge mistakenly obstructs arbitration, by
refusing to stay litigation or refusing to compel arbitration or perhaps by
enjoining the arbitration itself, the parties stand to lose completely all
benefits of arbitration. They often face the prospect of protracted, ex-
pensive litigation, with a potential great waste of economic as well as
judicial resources, unless the order may be promptly appealed. These,
then, are the real problem areas for which remedial legislation is needed
to regulate appeals.
They are adequately dealt with in Section 19A of the Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act which authorizes appeals only from orders interfering with the
arbitral process. But even if Federal legislation took a different form, and
regardless of whether appeals are allowed in other cases too, by right or
by certiorari, as long as the problem areas are covered, the bar should
support it. As things now stand, the constant litigation over appealability





Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777 (3d Cir. 1975) [appealable] with Limbach Co. v. Gevyn Constr.
Corp., 544 F.2d 1104 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 916 (1977) [not appealable]); a
refusal to confirm an award (Shearson Loeb Rhoades v. Much, 754 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1985)
[final award vacated and matter remanded to the arbitrator]; Sentry Life Ins. Co. v. Borad,
759 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1985) [final award vacated and case set down for trial]; Liberian Vertex
Transp. v. Association Bulk Carriers, 738 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984) [partial final award]); and
efforts to compel arbitration in bankruptcy proceedings. Zimmerman v. ContinentalAirlines,
712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman
Wheelabrator, 709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1983).
SPRING 1987
